Wednesday, March 25, 2009

The Intifada Problem

Andrew Exum writes in a recent post that 

Now why do I mention this? Because I'm sticking to my guns -- how you behave tactically has strategic effects on the modern battlefield. My central thesis, I believe, is correct -- whether you're talking about the U.S. military, the IDF, or any other Western military:


Relatively recently, a consensus has emerged stateside that well-drafted rules of engagement are A Good Thing, and protecting the population is A Better Thing. Those are broad, broad statements that have to be applied differently to different circumstances. But the central issue at play here is this: How do we assess those circumstances? How do we predict when populations will rise up in response to any particular deadly incident*? 

This is THE central hard problem political scientists and military strategists don't have an answer to. The First Intifada was triggered (not caused, but triggered) in part by a traffic accident. Both the PLO and Hamas were caught utterly flat-footed by the uprising, as was the IDF equally. The IDF thought it had the population pretty well in hand; West Bank Palestinians were at that point employed in fairly large numbers in Israeli cities,** they had decently-managed checkpoints, the PLO was in exile. 

Yet a series of small incidents triggered a massive amount of violence, and then escalation in response by the IDF. No particular change in ROE would have prevented it, and no particular predictor could have told you when violence was going to flare up. 

We know generalities about how violence versus respect matters once civil wars orinsurgencies are underway and there is a high pace of operations; telling US soldiers in Iraq to "First, do no harm" was a good call. But the majority of IDF interactions with Palestinians are at checkpoints, raids on houses, clashes at settlements, NOT high-intensity warfare. And I'm really skeptical that we have any clear idea about what the right tactics are to produce the strategic outcomes we desire in low-intensity operations and peacekeeping. 

(Crossposted to the Abu Muqawama comment thread)


*Phrase made intentionally broad not to just cover killings that violate the laws of war, but lawful warfare, accident, etc, etc, etc. 

**General disclaimer from now until eternity: If you look hard enough in this part of the world, you'll find a way to turn territorial terminology here into a statement of some political craziness. I almost certainly don't believe whatever you'd read the tea leaves to ascribe to me.

1 comment:

  1. Just thinking aloud but I've always thought checkpoints could be massively improved if, at the end of it, the soldiers gave everyone who passed a free chocolate or sweet in national colours. It might be fun to get some hoteliers in and ask them what improvements they thought could be added to the 'service'.

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