has never believed it could actually defeat the United States at so much as a ping-pong match. What it looks to do instead is lure the United States into strategically untenable situations in which the U.S. arouses widespread Muslim anger and experiences too much military pain at too high an economic price to justify a continued presence on the Arabian peninsula. We know this because, like, Osama bin Laden says it. It’s worked to some degree — a couple of years ago this country, like a less-self-aware Nicholas Cage in Leaving Las Vegas, went out of its mind and invaded and occupied Iraq — but nowhere near sufficiently, as the United State will undoubtedly retain an on-shore presence in the Peninsula, and much of the Arab world won’t really care so much. Could the economic crisis be an opportunity for ?
Well, yes, bin Laden says it. I don't know about you, but if I were a terrorist, I'd make a business out of saying anything that psyched out my opponent as much as possible. In other words, I think bin Laden wanted to humiliate the US with a short, victorious war, and only adopted the rhetoric of long-run quagmire afterwards. Since the two are somewhat similar, and the US presence has turned out to be long-lasting, it's easy to assume he always intended the latter rather than the former.
Now, the following is slightly risky to write about, since I could embarrass myself. So perceive the following as a request for evidence regarding bin Laden's strategy, where I'm willing very much to be proven wrong.
The quote Spencer links comes from a 2004 bin Laden tape. As far as I'm aware*, there is no pre-9/11 quotes where bin Laden says that he wanted to draw the US into a long-term, Russia-style quagmire (look, e.g., at this official, unclassified compilation of quotes by bin Laden, where the only references to quagmire come in 2002, and 2004, i.e. months after US invasions). He does refer to the US as a paper tiger, however.
He does say that he expects that the US won't last long in any post-attack invasion, just as it did not last long in Somalia, just as it didn't do anything major after the Embassy bombings. But the strategic goal there is essentially defensive - to outlast - rather than offensive - to wear down American forces and win in the field. America is metaphorically and theologically similar to Russia, but he seemed to think we wouldn't last as long in the field.
This rhetorical shift isn't without precedent; bin Laden only begins mentioning Israel-Palestine relatively late in al Qaeda's evolution for example.
Admittedly, the data are thin, but they seem to shade my way. First, it's too damned convenient for bin Laden, and lacks any sort of easy rebuttal. Second, the timing of his statements seems to fit that; he wanted to bloody the US, but in a relatively short time frame. Third, the September 10th, 2001 assassination of Massoud, a major Northern warlord, by AQ operatives seems to be a shaping operation for defensive purposes. Killing the local enemy with whom the US might ally, who might stick around after the Americans leave, seems to fit this narrative.
Could he have been willing to accept the possibility of a prolonged, Russia-style war? Sure. But I don't think that's what his main bet was on.
*Please correct me if I'm wrong; I've looked through compilations of bin Laden quotes in the past for this, but the number of expansive and/or dubious quotation compilations produced in recent years makes it hard to be certain about this. If I am wrong, I'd be glad to admit it.
No comments:
Post a Comment