Showing posts with label CNAS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CNAS. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

For God, For Country, and For....?

As you probably know by now, Tom Ricks of CNAS has kicked off a major discussion about the value of the service academies versus others means of commissioning students who attend public or private colleges, such as ROTC or OCS.

In some ways, this discussion is not only logical, but long overdue. The rise of COIN theory out of academic obscurity to political and strategic prominence has reminded people of how important intellectual firepower is, and how important flexibility in warfare is. At the same time, COIN warfare rewards giving commanders freedom to make smart local decisions, while democratizing the diffusion of expertise and knowledge amongst officers, regardless of commissioning source. Meanwhile, many universities, including most Ivies, don't allow ROTC on campus, and there's a huge desire to bring that back. 

However, I think Mr. Ricks isn't considering a bunch of objections to his argument that revolve around the fact that both the military, and academia, are complex social institutions. These objections fall into two major categories: "This is what happens to any academic institution"  and "Centralization has a purpose." 

Anyone who spends even a few hours listening to faculty members complain about their colleagues and departmental politics knows how important money is, and how likely it is that money is being spent unwisely. And there are easy academic routes to take at West Point? So too there are at other universities, and we all know people who BS their way through. And there are professors that don't care about educating their students exist in the Ivies as well, and prefer to focus on their side projects. Apples and apples, here. 

Similarly on the funding question, departments continue to grow to the limits of the funds provided. At the alma mater that I share with Mr. Ricks, the 4-year tuition, room and board cost is north of $160K, but that's only the external cost charged to the students and their families. The endowment kicks in far several times as much money per pupil, both to cover day-to-day operating costs and to improve facilities. So we end up with a total internal cost number in the same range as the very broad numbers being thrown about to discuss the service academies, without Yale having to pay the costs of deploying them as temporary third lieutenants, expending ammunition, providing facility security, etc, etc, etc.

In other words, yes, it costs more than other commissioning routes, but to do an academy at all requires this amount of funds. What reason, then, is there for the service academies? Why centralize the education of a significant portion of officers in these hulking campuses on crags or swamps? It may surprise you to know that scientific opinion now informs us that the appendix, rather than being purely useless, also acts as a reservoir of important immune system information. Schools are much the same way.

First, having academies produces a powerful incentive to keep around active-duty officers who think long and hard about the same problems for a long time, to a degree not possible in the military in general. Even if you assume that Ricks' preferred alternative results in a greater number of better-educated officers, there's no certainty that those officers will keep their intellectual skillsets fresh to the same degree as officers who get to be in the classroom. This is particularly true, I suspect, given that classrooms face these thinkers every day with the questions of cadets. This unparalleled opportunity for confrontation in a hierarchical military may force officer-teachers to rethink first principles in a way they otherwise would not. 

Think of it this way: General Petraeus pulled much of his staff directly out of the West Point Social Science faculty, as Ricks acknowledges. There are other Ph.Ds in the Army, and lots of graduates of the war colleges, and lots of former Army think-tankers, too. Why did he pick the people he did?  How much is a well-executed Surge worth to the American taxpayer, in terms of West Point operating budget-years?

I also wonder if the prestige effect of service academies may paradoxically allow for more change than would otherwise occur. If teaching of army values was more diffuse, then army culture could easily become beholden to no one and difficult to alter systematically, spread as it would be across ROTC, OCS, PLC; a large number of sites and a variety of training programs. By contrast, the prestige of the academies allows for values  and ideas to be quickly inculcated in a large batch of future officers, for good, or as Mr. Ricks rightly points out, for ill. 

Similarly, I wonder if it might allow for more dissent, both by academy graduates and their instructors. The seal of approval that an academy offers its graduates means that it's harder to accuse a reformer or dissenter of being unmilitary in their values or beliefs; at the same time, the responsibility for teaching cadets well allows for instructors to make broader and more pressing claims about what is being taught, and how, than might occur otherwise. This can cut both ways - consider how effective Gian Gentile has been at arguing for his position, in part because of his status as a leading and respected member of the West Point academic community.

Second, I'm highly skeptical of the claim that the promotion system, or evaluations by superiors alone, can capture all of the relevant data as to whether service academies produce better officers. For example, I would love to see an analysis of the effectiveness of service academy graduates at training Iraqi and Afghan security forces on land, and at conducting joint exercises and knowledge transfer in the air and sea realms. It seems plausible to me that cadets who trained in a highly-hierarchical environment where they had to teach their juniors military discipline, skills, etc, might well be particularly good as officers at training missions by comparison to others who did not have to do so for the same length or to the same degree in OCS (ROTC I don't know enough about to meaningfully say - Yale lacks it). It's a commonly repeated (albeit unproven) complaint that success in those fields does not correlate with promotions or positive evaluations; if that's the case, then Mr. Ricks' reports from the field wouldn't capture that highly-vital factor, or other similar and relevant data.

Finally, suppose that Ricks' conclusion gets backed up by a series of major studies, and it really does cost more to run service academies, and it really doesn't produce better individual soldiers.  That doesn't mean that DoD, as a system, does not benefit tremendously from having service academy graduates. It may well be that there is a tremendous value to the personnel system of knowing that a standardized product of roughly X officers per year, who are guaranteed to know A, B, and C within the following long-established statistical bounds, will be commissioned on a date certain. I imagine this is much more difficult to do with ROTC and OCS, where so much relies upon local recruitment and organization.

Does any one of these reasons suffice to justify a service academy? Not necessarily. But the data is as yet really shaky, and these factors aren't being considered, which should fill anyone expressing strong opinions on the topic with great caution. 


Thursday, April 2, 2009

Quantity Does Not Have A Quality of its Own...

...but it sure can be helpful.  Last night, at CNAS's talk and reception for David Kilcullen's new book (hereafter to be referred to as "COIN Prom"), I had a fascinating conversation with a foreign officer who said something to the effect that Americans never do anything small* because we have the ability to go big, which can make us impatient; by contrast, smaller European, ISAF, etc forces have to be deliberate and think everything through painfully, since they lack that sort of cushion. 

(After hashing this thought over with a naval officer also involved in the conversation, we amended to "unless it's really, really expensive. Then, the smaller, the better." Whoever said that sarcasm was dead?)
 
And though certainly we don't have enough forces in the Army, or the civilian agencies, to tackle our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan as quickly or as effectively as we'd like, it's still nonetheless true that we do have a lot more flexibility than many of our allies. 

I think that's true, but that also got me to thinking about how in some sense, there's a genius to using large forces more effectively than small forces alone. Military leaders often get a bad rap in historical accounts for being too attrition-focused; this is frankly probably a historiographic legacy of World War I, and then Vietnam two generations of scholars later. Outside of Napoleon's use of brigades, people rarely talk about the organizational genius that it takes to effectively employ large forces and direct them effectively in battle.

Put it another way, there's an unexamined genius involved in using America's military might to result in increasing returns to scale, rather than constant or decreasing returns.  

After all, coordinating that many forces can be well-nigh paralyzing; you might argue that McClellan faced exactly such a problem during the Civil War, while Grant used his massive manpower advantage to seek battle more frequently, even if at first he met with mixed results. 
Similar results obtain in more modern wars; after all, the obvious call in the invasion of Baghdad in 2003 was to surround the city and then slowly work in, using overwhelming firepower, not the genius finesse move of sprinting a force deep inside the city to capture Baghdad's airport, and backing it up with air power, etc, in a pincer move. Or Schwartzpkof's great wheel in the desert, etc, etc, you can insert your own examples here. 

But what does this mean for COIN? After all, we talk about flooding the zone, and minimum required troop ratios of 20 troops per thousand inhabitants, but what are the radical variations on that not only require, but take fullest advantage of having a lot of troops and materiel? (The "Surge" is not an acceptable answer, since it was a response to having too few people; the Baghdad "Anaconda"** strategy might be heading in that direction.)

This is the sort of idea that I'm going to poke at for a while.



*On behalf of all military history fans everywhere, may I beg for a moratorium on using "Anaconda" as the name of military strategies for at least a few years? We get it, it's good and evocative. But it's been used twice since 2001 alone! 

Thursday, February 26, 2009

What Sort of Afghan Insurgency?

 I just got back from a press conference with Afghan Minister of Defense General Abdul Rahim Wardak hosted by The Center for a New American Security.  

Though the room, and the Q&A period, was more-or-less-choked by reporters fishing (poorly!) for process stories, some really interesting things got said.

Most notable was that General Wardak specifically indicated that he thought that the insurgency was "primarily urban, [though] supplemented  by a modified Maoist rural insurgency." (emphasis added) This departs from the emerging conventional wisdom on Afghanistan-Pakistan, which is that it is a primarily rural insurgency. There are three ways to spin this:

1. He just doesn't know what he's talking about. - Unlikely. He's very widely respected in Afghanistan.
2. He considers the real challenge ("Center of gravity" to military folks) to be urban centers in southern Afghanistan, or even in the FATA region of Pakistan, with the rural areas a symptom of the problem. - More likely, but still out of congruence with analyses by Kilcullen, etc, much less academic literature like Libby Wood's Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*
3. He was specifically signaling the possibility of reconciliation with individuals who don't threaten the urban core, i.e. by implying that they are not really "the enemy," and can be negotiated with. If true, then the idea of "defining down" war aims -which, to be fair, he did disagree with in his speech- may become the implicit consequence of our strategy there.

Why do I think it's the 3rd option? Well, as Spencer Ackerman alludes to -man, is he a posting machine or what- the new Afghan local militia program is going to be used to secure Highway 1 from Kabul to Herat. While, yes, controlling the cities and the roads are key for any military plan, this is starting to look a lot like the 1970s-style tribal autonomy for rural areas, combined with strong control over urban areas and the key roads.

Oh, one more thing, which probably fully descends into crazy speculation: better security on the road from Kabul to Herat would allow for resupply through Herat if logistics through Pakistan continues to fall apart. Herat, of course, is just over the border from Iran...

* Full disclosure - she advised my senior essay


Thursday, February 12, 2009

I'll Have What They're Having

Earlier this evening, I was lucky enough to go to a CNAS launch event for Tom Ricks' new book, The Gamble.  While the centerpiece of the evening was undoubtedly the banter between Nagl and Ricks (the Wallace and Davis of COIN?), and getting to meet some really interesting people, there's one important fact to report:

The bar served Cabernet Sauvignon.* I guess we know what side CNAS is taking in the great Counterinsurgency Drink Wars... 



*Okay, and Chardonnay, and a couple beer selections too.