Some Western camp (I know the Pict) or granite border keep

Via Andrew Exum, I see that the Department of Defense is considering creating 

[A]n experienced cadre of officers and senior enlisted soldiers, who would rotate between assignments in Afghanistan and at their home stations until the end of hostilities. 

By doing so, the Pentagon hopes to end a problem that has plagued the effort in Afghanistan—the lack of familiarity with local conditions by U.S. forces who rotate in and then depart after a year, just when they are beginning to understand the area or the mission where they are assigned. 

“These would be small groups who would deploy together for shorter periods, going back and forth to the same place and the same mission again and again, so they would know the culture and the terrain,” said a senior Pentagon official briefed on the plan, who said the teams could be asked to conduct training or other specialized counterinsurgency missions.

 

This is a good idea, overall. We don't have enough local knowledge built up, and having the same people return to the area later can certainly act as a form of proof that our promises to and relationships with locals last longer than a single tour. 

But I also wonder about the possible downsides as well. How can we make sure that units don't develop the "Not-Invented-Here" syndrome, either in terms of intelligence evaluations of their own battlespace or in terms of bringing over new techniques from other areas? Sometimes this will make sense; Korengal's is different from northern Afghanistan is different from Helmand, etc. Sometimes, the accretion of assumptions and practices will be problematic. (Don't get me wrong, the US Army and Marines have had to learn new tactics and operational techniques, been challenged by enemy adaptation, and responded with throwing it all away and learning it all again with aplomb. Not saying that local commands can't, or even largely won't, do that. Just that it's something to keep in mind.)

Additionally, God forbid this happens, but if it gets adapted as a general practice, in this or some future war we may have a lot of Afghan COIN experts in US ranks just as the same time as we get involved in another country where the insurgency has wildly different organization and tactics. (Yes, Dr. Gentile's critique of FM 3-24 as being too focused on beating Maoists probably has a point to it...) Remember, some British troops who fought in Malaya also fought in Kenya, with rather different results...

Similarly, what will ensure that our soldiers don't develop (unconscious and wholly human) bias towards the parochial concerns of locals that sticks with them in future higher-level commands in the same country? This is probably to some extent unavoidable, and not necessarily a bad thing, but how do we avoid people going too native?

On the more academic side, what's the smart training cycle for the returning cadre while they're stateside? Repeated visits means a higher ROI on additional, area-specific training. Do we push localized language and cultural education at them (or, heck, PRT-complementary training by sending them to learn about agriculture, road construction, whatever)?

Finally, this is going to be a brilliantly useful data set for comparative study, so long as someone keeps track of it. I really hope that RAND, Booz Allen, etc, as well as the pure academic sector, get in on the ground floor. A Minerva Project grant devoted to this would be a smart call.

(Crossposted as a comment on Abu Muqawama)